The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance<\/a>.<\/strong><\/em> Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2008).<\/p>\n Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946-1997<\/a><\/strong><\/em>. <\/strong>Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press (2003). Issued in paperback 2004.<\/p>\n \u201cPolitical Control and the Forms of Agency Independence,<\/strong><\/em>\u201d (with Jennifer L. Selin) George<\/em> Washington<\/em> Law Review<\/em>, forthcoming.<\/p>\n “Presidents and Patronage.”<\/a> <\/em><\/strong>(with Gary E. Hollibaugh, Jr. and Gabe Horton), forthcoming, American Journal of Political Science. Supplementary Appendix<\/a><\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n “Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight.”<\/a><\/em><\/strong> (with Joshua d. Clinton and Jennifer L. Selin), forthcoming, American Journal of Political Science.<\/em><\/p>\n Government Reform, Political Ideology, and Administrative Burden: The Case of Performance Management in the Bush Administration.” <\/a><\/strong><\/em>(with Stephane Lavertu and Donald P. Moynihan) Public Administration Review 73 (60: 845-57 (2013)<\/p>\n “Policy Influence, Agency-Specific Expertise, and Exit in the Federal Service”<\/a><\/em><\/strong>(with Anthony M. Bertelli).\u00a0Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory <\/em>23(2):223-245 (2013).\u00a0[Formerly, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions Working Paper # 02-13] CSDI Policy Brief 2013-05<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cPolitics Can Limit Policy Opportunism in Fiscal Institutions: Evidence from Official General Fund Revenue Forecasts in the American States,\u201d<\/a><\/strong><\/em> (with George A. Krause and James Douglas). Journal of Policy Analysis and Management <\/em>32(2):271-95 (2013). [Formerly, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions Working Paper# 03-09]<\/p>\n \u201cThe Invisible Presidential Appointments: An Examination of Appointments to the Department of Labor, 2001-2011,\u201d<\/a><\/strong><\/em> (with Richard W. Waterman). Presidential Studies Quarterly <\/em>43 (1): 35-57 (2013).<\/p>\n \u201cThe Personnel Process in the Modern Presidency.\u201d<\/a><\/strong>Presidential Studies <\/em>Quarterly <\/em>42(3):577-96 (2012).<\/p>\n “Separated Powers in the United States,”<\/a><\/strong><\/em> (with Joshua D. Clinton, Anthony Bertelli, Christian Grose, and David C. Nixon). American Journal of Political Science<\/em>, 56(2):341-54 (2012) [Formerly, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions Working Paper # 05-09.]<\/p>\n \u201cThe Consequences of Presidential Patronage for Agency Performance<\/a>,\u201d <\/strong><\/em>(with Nick Gallo).\u00a0Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. <\/em>22(2): 219-243 (2012).\u00a0[Formerly, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions Working Paper # 01-10.] CSDI Policy Brief 2013-04<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cPresidential Appointments and Personnel<\/a>.\u201d<\/strong> Annual Review of Political Science <\/em>14 (June):47-66 (2011).<\/p>\n “Measurement and Public Service Motivation: New Insights, Old Questions<\/a>,”<\/strong> International Public Management Journal. <\/em>13(1):1-10 (2010).<\/p>\n \u201cModern Presidents and the Transformation of the Federal Personnel System,\u201d\u00a0The<\/em> Forum<\/em>, 7(4): Article 6 (2010). (http:\/\/www.bepress.com\/forum\/vol7\/iss4\/art6<\/a>)<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cRevisiting the Administrative Presidency: Policy, Patronage, and Administrative Competence.<\/a><\/em>\u201d<\/strong> Presidential Studies Quarterly<\/em>, 39 (1):60-73 (2009)<\/p>\n \u201cManagement and Leadership Performance in the Defense Department: Evidence from Surveys of Federal Employees<\/a>.\u201d<\/strong><\/em> (with Major Paul S. Oh, U.S. Army)\u00a0Armed Forces and Society<\/em>, 34(4):639-661 (2008).\u00a0Policy Brief lewis_surveys.pdf<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cNot-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design<\/a>,\u201d<\/strong><\/em> (with Neal Devins)\u00a0Boston University Law Review<\/em>, 88(2):459-98 (2008).<\/p>\n \u201cExpert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences<\/a>,\u201d<\/strong> <\/em>(with Joshua D. Clinton).\u00a0Political Analysis<\/em>, 16(1):3-16 (2008).<\/p>\n \u201cToward a Broader Understanding of Presidential Power: A Re-Evaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis<\/a>,\u201d<\/strong><\/em> (with Brandice Canes-Wrone and William G. Howell).\u00a0Journal of Politics<\/em>70(1):1-16 (2008).<\/p>\n \u201cTesting Pendleton\u2019s Premise: Do Political Appointees Make Worse Bureaucrats?<\/a><\/strong>\u201dJournal of Politics<\/em> 69(4):1073-88 (2007).\u00a0Policy brief (lewis_performance.pdf<\/a>)<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cDoes Performance Budgeting Work? An Examination of OMB\u2019s PART Scores<\/a>.\u201d<\/strong> <\/em>(with John B. Gilmour)\u00a0Public Administration Review<\/em> 66(5):742-52 (2006).<\/p>\n \u201cPolitical Appointments, Civil Service Systems, and Bureaucratic Competence: Organizational Balancing and Gubernatorial Revenue Forecasts in the American States<\/a>.\u201d<\/strong> <\/em>(with George Krause and James Douglas)\u00a0American Journal of Political Science<\/em> 50(3):770-87 (2006).<\/p>\n \u201cAssessing Performance Assessment for Budgeting: The Influence of Politics, Performance, and Program Size in FY 2005<\/a>.\u201d<\/strong><\/em> (with John B. Gilmour)\u00a0Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory <\/em>16(2):169-86 (2006).<\/p>\n \u201cPolitical Appointees and the Competence of Federal Program Management<\/a>.\u201d<\/strong> <\/em>(with John B. Gilmour)\u00a0American Politics Research<\/em> 34(1):22-50 (2006).\u00a0Policy brief (lewis_appointees.pdf<\/a>)<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cStaffing Alone: Unilateral Action and the Politicization of the Executive Office of the President, 1988-2004<\/a>.\u201d<\/strong> Presidential Studies Quarterly<\/em> 35(3):496-514 (2005).<\/p>\n \u201cPolitical Learning from Rare Events: Poisson Inference, Fiscal Constraints and the Lifetime of Bureaus<\/a><\/em>.\u201d<\/strong> (with Daniel C. Carpenter)\u00a0Political Analysis<\/em> 12(3):201-32 (2004).<\/p>\n \u201cThe Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presidential Management in the United States: The Relative Durability of Insulated Agencies<\/a>.\u201d<\/strong> British Journal of Political Science<\/em> 34:377-404 (2004).<\/p>\n \u201cThe Irrational Escalation of Commitment and the Ironic Labor Politics of the Rust Belt<\/a>.\u201d<\/strong><\/em> (with Glenn Beamer).\u00a0Enterprise and Society<\/em> 4(4):676-306 (2003).<\/p>\n \u201cAgencies by Presidential Design<\/a>.\u201d<\/strong><\/em> (with William G. Howell).\u00a0Journal of Politics<\/em> 64(4):1095-1114 (2002).<\/p>\nArticles<\/h2>\n