{"id":459,"date":"2018-07-13T11:48:40","date_gmt":"2018-07-13T16:48:40","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/my.dev.vanderbilt.edu\/davidlewis\/?page_id=459"},"modified":"2024-09-23T14:24:50","modified_gmt":"2024-09-23T19:24:50","slug":"articles","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/my.dev.vanderbilt.edu\/davidlewis\/articles\/","title":{"rendered":"Articles"},"content":{"rendered":"

“Measuring the Impact of Appointee Vacancies on U.S. Federal Agency Performance,”<\/a> (with Mark D. Richardson and Chris Piper), Journal of Politics, forthcoming.<\/p>\n

“Presidential Investment in the Administrative State,” (with Nick Bednar) American<\/em> Political<\/em> Science<\/em> Review<\/em>, forthcoming [download paper]<\/a><\/p>\n

“The Independent Agency Myth,” (with Neal Devins), Cornell Law review<\/em>, forthcoming. [download paper]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cDo Vacancies Hurt Federal Agency Performance?\u201d (with Christopher M. Piper), Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory <\/em>33(2):313-28 (2023). [download paper<\/a>] [download supplementary appendix]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cIs the Failed Pandemic Response a Symptom of a Diseased Administrative State?\u201d Daedalus<\/em> 150(3):68-88 (Summer 2021). [download paper]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cElections, Ideology, and Turnover in the U.S. Federal Government,\u201d (with Alexander D. Bolton and John M. de Figueiredo), Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory <\/em>31(2):451-66 (2021). [download paper]<\/a><\/p>\n

“The Very Best People: President Trump and the Management of Executive Personnel,” (with Mark D. Richardson) Presidential Studies Quarterly<\/em> 51 (1):51-70 (2021). [download paper]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cPartisan Procurement: Contracting with the United States Federal Government, 2003-2015,\u201d (with Carl Dahlstrom and Mihaly Fazekas),\u00a0American Journal of Political Science<\/em> 65(3):652-69.\u00a0 [download paper]<\/a><\/p>\n

“Public-sector Personnel Economics: Wages, Promotions, and the Competence-Control Trade-Off,” (with Charles M. Cameron and John M. de Figueiredo) Advances in Strategic Management<\/em> 41:111-48 (2020) [download paper]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cPresidents and Turnover in Regulatory Personnel,\u201d (with Kathleen Doherty and Scott Limbocker) Administration & Society<\/em>, 51:1-25 (2019). [download paper]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cDeconstructing the Administrative State,\u201d Journal of Politics<\/em>, 81(3):767-89 (2019). [download paper]<\/a><\/p>\n

Executive Control and Turnover in the Senior Executive Service,\u201d (with Kathleen Doherty and Scott Limbocker) Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory <\/em>29(2):159-74 (2019) [Download paper<\/a>] [Online appendix<\/a>].<\/p>\n

\u201cPresident Trump as Manager: Reflections on the First Year.\u201d (with Patrick Bernhard and Emily H. You) Presidential Studies Quarterly <\/em>48 (3):480-501. [Download paper]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cElite Perceptions of Agency Ideology and Workforce Skill.\u201d (with Mark D. Richardson and Joshua D. Clinton) Journal of Politics<\/em> 80(1):303-7 (2018). [Download paper]<\/a> [Online Appendix]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cAgency Performance Challenges and Agency Politicization.\u201d (with Abby K. Wood) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory<\/em> 27(4):581-95 (2017). [Download paper] <\/a>[Online Appendix]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cPolitical Control and the Forms of Agency Independence.\u201d (with Jennifer L. Selin) George Washington Law Review<\/em> 83(4\/5):1487-1516 (2015). [Download paper]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cPresidents and Patronage.\u201d (with Gary E. Hollibaugh, Jr. and Gabe Horton), American Journal of Political Science <\/em>58(4):1024-1042 (2014). [Download paper] <\/a>[Online Appendix]<\/a> [Policy brief]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cInfluencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight.\u201d (with Joshua D. Clinton and Jennifer L. Selin), American Journal of Political Science <\/em>58(2):387-401 (2014). [Download paper]<\/a> [Policy brief]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cGovernment Reform, Political Ideology, and Administrative Burden: The Case of Performance Management in the Bush Administration.\u201d (with St\u00e9phane Lavertu and Donald P. Moynihan) Public Administration Review<\/em> 73(6):845-57 (2013). [Download paper] <\/a>[Policy brief]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cPolicy Influence, Agency-Specific Expertise, and Exit in the Federal Service.\u201d (with Anthony M. Bertelli) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory<\/em> 23(2):223-245 (2013). [Download paper<\/a>] [Policy brief<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cPolitics Can Limit Policy Opportunism in Fiscal Institutions: Evidence from Official General Fund Revenue Forecasts in the American States.\u201d (with George A. Krause and James Douglas) Journal of Policy Analysis and Management<\/em> 32(2):271-95 (2013). [Download paper<\/a>] [Online Appendix<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Invisible Presidential Appointments: An Examination of Appointments to the Department of Labor, 2001-2011.\u201d (with Richard W. Waterman) Presidential Studies Quarterly<\/em> 43 (1): 35-57 (2013). [Download paper<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Personnel Process in the Modern Presidency.\u201d Presidential Studies Quarterly<\/em> 42(3):577-96 (2012). [Download paper<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cSeparated Powers in the United States.\u201d (with Joshua D. Clinton, Anthony M. Bertelli, Christian Grose, and David C. Nixon) American Journal of Political Science<\/em> 56(2):341-54 (2012). [Download paper<\/a>] [Online Appendix<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Consequences of Presidential Patronage for Agency Performance.\u201d (with Nick Gallo) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory<\/em>. 22(2): 219-243 (2012). [Download paper]<\/a> [Supplementary material<\/a>] [Policy brief<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cPresidential Appointments and Personnel.\u201d Annual Review of Political Science <\/em>14 (June):47-66 (2011). [Download paper<\/a>]<\/p>\n

“Measurement and Public Service Motivation: New Insights, Old Questions.” International Public Management Journal<\/em> 13(1):1-10 (2010). [Download paper]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cModern Presidents and the Transformation of the Federal Personnel System.\u201d The<\/em> Forum<\/em>, 7(4): Article 6 (2010). [Download paper<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cRevisiting the Administrative Presidency: Policy, Patronage, and Administrative Competence.\u201d Presidential Studies Quarterly<\/em> 39 (1):60-73 (2009). [Download paper<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cManagement and Leadership Performance in the Defense Department: Evidence from Surveys of Federal Employees.\u201d (with Major Paul S. Oh, U.S. Army) Armed Forces and Society<\/em> 34(4): 639-661 (2008). [Download paper<\/a>] [Online appendix<\/a>] [Policy brief<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cNot-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design.\u201d (with Neal Devins) Boston University Law Review<\/em> 88(2):459-98 (2008). [Download paper<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cExpert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences.\u201d (with Joshua D. Clinton) Political Analysis<\/em> 16(1):3-16 (2008). [Download paper<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cToward a Broader Understanding of Presidential Power: A Re-Evaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis.\u201d\u00a0 (with Brandice Canes-Wrone and William G. Howell) Journal of Politics<\/em> 70(1):1-16 (2008). [Download paper<\/a>] [Online appendix<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cTesting Pendleton\u2019s Premise: Do Political Appointees Make Worse Bureaucrats?\u201d Journal of Politics<\/em> 69(4):1073-88 (2007). [Download paper<\/a>] [Online appendix<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cDoes Performance Budgeting Work? An Examination of OMB\u2019s PART Scores.\u201d (with John B. Gilmour) Public Administration Review<\/em> 66(5):742-52 (2006). [Download paper<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cPolitical Appointments, Civil Service Systems, and Bureaucratic Competence: Organizational Balancing and Gubernatorial Revenue Forecasts in the American States.\u201d (with George Krause and James Douglas) American Journal of Political Science<\/em> 50(3):770-87 (2006). [Download paper<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cAssessing Performance Budgeting at OMB: The Influence of Politics, Performance, and Program Size.\u201d (with John B. Gilmour) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory<\/em> 16(2):169-86 (2006). [Download paper<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cPolitical Appointees and the Competence of Federal Program Management.\u201d (with John B. Gilmour) American Politics Research<\/em> 34(1):22-50 (2006). [Download paper<\/a>] [Policy brief<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cStaffing Alone: Unilateral Action and the Politicization of the Executive Office of the President, 1988-2004.\u201d Presidential Studies Quarterly<\/em> 35(3):496-514 (2005). [Download paper<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cPolitical Learning from Rare Events: Poisson Inference, Fiscal Constraints and the Lifetime of Bureaus.\u201d (with Daniel C. Carpenter) Political Analysis<\/em> 12(3):201-32 (2004). [Download paper<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presidential Management in the United States: The Relative Durability of Insulated Agencies.\u201d British Journal of Political Science<\/em> 34:377-404 (2004). [Download paper<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Irrational Escalation of Commitment and the Ironic Labor Politics of the Rust Belt.\u201d (with Glenn Beamer) Enterprise and Society<\/em> 4(4):676-306 (2003). [Download paper]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cAgencies by Presidential Design.\u201d (with William G. Howell) Journal of Politics <\/em>64(4):1095-1114 (2002). [Download paper<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Politics of Agency Termination:\u00a0 Confronting the Myth of Agency Immortality.\u201d Journal of Politics<\/em> 64(1):89-107 (2002). [Download paper<\/a>]<\/p>\n

“What Time Is It? The Use of Power in Four Different Types of Presidential Time.” (with James Michael Strine) Journal of Politics<\/em> 58(3):682-706 (1996). [Download paper]<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

“Measuring the Impact of Appointee Vacancies on U.S. Federal Agency Performance,” (with Mark D. Richardson and Chris Piper), Journal of Politics, forthcoming. “Presidential Investment in the Administrative State,” (with Nick Bednar) American Political Science Review, forthcoming [download paper] “The Independent Agency Myth,” (with Neal Devins), Cornell Law review, forthcoming. [download paper] \u201cDo Vacancies Hurt Federal…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4093,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"tags":[],"class_list":["post-459","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.dev.vanderbilt.edu\/davidlewis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/459","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.dev.vanderbilt.edu\/davidlewis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.dev.vanderbilt.edu\/davidlewis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/my.dev.vanderbilt.edu\/davidlewis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4093"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/my.dev.vanderbilt.edu\/davidlewis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=459"}],"version-history":[{"count":95,"href":"https:\/\/my.dev.vanderbilt.edu\/davidlewis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/459\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1206,"href":"https:\/\/my.dev.vanderbilt.edu\/davidlewis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/459\/revisions\/1206"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.dev.vanderbilt.edu\/davidlewis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=459"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/my.dev.vanderbilt.edu\/davidlewis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=459"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}